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Abstract: At first sight the "big (or all-you-can-eat) deal" seems excellent value for 
libraries and their users, and represents the shining possibilities of the electronic age.  A 
more thorough-going evaluation, however, exposes dangers for universities, their funders 
and publishers.  This paper examines the big deal in the light of fundamental market 
conditions and suggests alternative models for procuring electronic resources. 
 
The roles and strengths of the players in the information supply chain are defined: 
creators, publishers, intermediaries, libraries.  Traditional hard-copy procurement is 
analysed in terms of these roles and the concepts of authority, branding and monopoly.  
The (often overlooked) role of and benefits secured by hard-copy purchasing consortia 
are examined.  Cost savings are shown to arise from competition in the market-place. 
 
The fundamentals of procuring electronic resources and prevalent purchasing models are 
discussed in terms of the same roles and concepts.  The advantages of the big deal are 
laid out  - access to resources, low unit costs etc.  The dangers are also discussed.  These 
arise mainly from the publishers' position as monopolists.  The possible long-term 
effects, on library budgets and academic publishing, of dealing with monopoly suppliers 
are examined. 
 
Means of avoiding or minimising these dangers -  consortia, alternative publishing 
methods, new economic models to promote competition - are examined. 
 
This article is a revised and updated version of a paper given at the IATUL conference 
held in Ankara, Turkey in 2003. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a common European folk-tale, often called ‘the little porridge pot’.  It tells the 
story of a family of hungry peasants who are given a magic cooking pot by the usual 
mysterious outsider.  They are told two words of command: one makes the pot produce 
an endless supply of porridge; the second makes it stop.  The pot will obviously change 
the peasants’ lives: hunger, and the fear of it, will be banished by a ready, endless supply 
of food: humble, monotonous perhaps in modern eyes, but a nourishing staple.  All is 
well; the peasants no longer go to bed hungry. 
 
However, one day the daughter of the family is left alone in the peasants’ cottage.  She 
instructs the pot to cook; unfortunately she has forgotten the word of command to make it 
stop.  When the rest of the family returns that evening, the village and fields are covered 
in a sea of porridge, which is starting to invade the forest. 
 
As with all folk-tales, there are many resonances for the modern world.  We live in an 
information-hungry society.  The electronic medium, delivered through the desk-top 
porridge-pot, offers a means of stilling that hunger.  However the message of this paper is 
that, just like the little porridge pot, electronic information is not an unalloyed good: it 
has dangers and threats for the continuance of publishing and the library profession.  In 
particular our freedom to choose and shape our collections is being eroded, and the 
power of the large electronic publishers is growing. 
 
This paper discusses:  
 
♦ the information value chain and some of its concepts, paying particular attention to 
features differentiating electronic from printed information; 
♦ money as an indicator of value; 
♦ the implications of the publishers’ monopoly for pricing and negotiation; 
♦ the implications of the product-to-service shift for archiving and access; 
♦ business models for e-resources, particularly the big, or all-you-can-eat, deal; 
♦ the loss of control by librarians and strategies to regain control. 
 
The opinions expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of 
Bournemouth University. 
 
2. The information value chain 
Following Mark Bide’s useful taxonomy, we can identify the following activities or 
functions in the information supply chain: creation, publication, aggregation, access and 
use.1  To a greater or lesser degree, each of the activities, or links, adds value to the 
information, until it is used and the value realised.  This account is somewhat simplified: 
I shall not discuss exhaustively the roles of all the players in the chain, but concentrate on 
the key ones.  Some of the main concepts applied during this discussion are: branding, 
authority, monopoly, and the product-to-service shift. 
 
Each link in the chain confers an element of branding or authority on the information.  
Authority has to do with reliability, informed opinion, having status or expertise.  One 
thinks for instance of the BBC: a news broadcast in the World Service carries a great deal 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to Mark Bide for his analysis of the information value chain in the 1998 study for ECUP+: 
Business models for distribution, archiving and use of electronic information: towards a value chain 
perspective. 
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of authority.  Branding has to do with consistency and quality.  Examples might be Coca-
Cola and Pepsi Cola: these are different brands, with different qualities, consistent in 
themselves and having different adherents. 
 
Each link in the chain also has a greater or lesser degree of monopoly.  This is  
particularly important for the information market place.  I shall therefore highlight where 
monopolies and competition lie, how they can be used to advantage, and the problems 
they cause the purchaser or user. 
 
One major factor differentiating electronic from printed information is the shift from 
product to service.  With printed information, much labour and cost are tied up in 
producing, distributing, storing and handling a physical product: books and serials.  With 
electronic information, libraries and other intermediaries generally only deal in access to 
information held in a remote location, a service not a product.  It is worth noting that this 
shift follows a general trend, as companies and public bodies outsource more and more 
activities. 
 
2.1 Creation 
Creation is a familiar concept, and needs no long discussion.  Creators may be authors or 
compilers.  They may be directly employed by publishers, as are journalists and technical 
writers.  Alternatively they may be independent agents. 
 
Particularly in popular fiction, the creator confers authority.  One obvious example is 
Stephen King: picking one of his novels from the shelf one knows what one is getting.  
On the cover it is his name, not the title, that has prominence.  The creator is also a 
monopolist: only Stephen King produces his novels.  This monopoly, protected by 
copyright, is then generally transferred to a single publisher. 
 
2.2 Publication 
Publication is essentially concerned with the selection and editing of information into 
consumable form.  In one sense it is a form of quality control. 
 
Publishers also package information into usable and buyable units (titles, series, 
journals), market the product, and undertake, or subcontract, physical production and 
distribution. 
 
For librarians, authority is conferred in part at least by the imprint – Oxford University 
Press, for instance, or Butterworths.  The end-user is more likely to focus on the brand – 
British Medical Journal, Nature or Who’s Who.  This holds equally true for academic 
publications, where the editorial and refereeing process is concentrated at the level of the 
title, as for general publications. 
 
The publisher’s monopoly, often transferred from the creator, is also jealously defended. 
 
For those involved in procurement, the delivery of information in electronic form 
embodies some important differences from the delivery in printed form. 
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There is essentially no physical production and distribution of electronic information.  
There is a physical realisation at the moment of use – as an image on a computer screen 
or a print-out.  But this occurs only at the end of the information chain, not close to the 
origin, as happens with print.  For the rest of the chain we are talking about access to the 
information, not a physical product containing the information.  We, as purchasers, are 
therefore now buying a service as opposed to a physical product. 
 
We should also note that, with electronic information, authority is potentially diluted.  It 
is easy to publish and disseminate information on the web, far easier than publishing and 
disseminating in print, which require considerable investment of money and time.  It has 
become correspondingly difficult to establish the authenticity and provenance of 
information. 
 
2.3 Aggregation 
One may define aggregation as: bringing together in a coherent collection disparate 
information sources.  Clearly this is core territory for the information professional.  The 
traditional activity of acquisition that formed our large historic libraries is now 
increasingly underpinned by the procurement process and the support and expertise of 
procurement professionals, who are bringing greater regulation and management into this 
process and increasing value for money for their institutions. 
 
Libraries confer authority by virtue of selecting material.  Users, whether students or 
members of the public, perceive a certain warranty of fitness for purpose if a book is on 
their library’s shelves.  Libraries also have a perhaps unrecognised near monopoly on 
such aggregations of printed information.  There are few alternatives, except a bookshop, 
where stock, facilities and opportunities for consultation and loan are severely limited or 
impossible. 
 
It is important to note in this context the accent on the physical product.  Much of a 
traditional library’s work deals with acquiring, processing and handling these physical 
products.  Increasingly, as far as the acquisitions process goes, this is subcontracted or 
outsourced to intermediaries, such as booksellers or serials agents. 
 
With electronic information, there is no physical product to acquire or handle.  The role 
of aggregator therefore moves elsewhere in the supply chain, to the publisher or 
intermediary such as the serials agent.  There is also a trend to ‘virtual’ aggregation, with 
services such as CrossRef www.crossref.org , where the articles of major serials 
publishers are linked, while remaining on servers run by the publishers themselves. 
 
The collective and near monopoly of libraries , evident for printed information, is 
therefore lost: users need set foot nowhere near a library to have access to aggregators’ 
sites; they simply need a network connection, and either the appropriate permissions or 
deep pockets. 
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2.4 Access 
Facilitating and controlling access to aggregated printed information is again core 
territory for libraries, needing little explanation. 
 
Selective dissemination of information raises awareness.  Catalogues, bibliographies and 
indexes aid discovery and location.  User education, particularly in academic libraries, 
trains users in gaining efficient access to and effectively exploiting information.  Library 
management systems control access to collections. 
Libraries here too have a perhaps unrecognised near monopoly on providing access and 
the tools that support it. 
Providing access to electronic information is however fundamentally different. 
One prerequisite is a robust IT infrastructure to deliver the information. In the UK this 
infrastructure is well established in academic libraries and is now extending to the citizen 
following recent investment in the public library sector. 
However, many of our users have their own PCs and Internet connections.  Soon set-top 
boxes will deliver Internet connectivity through the television screen.  Provision and 
installation of such set-top boxes may follow the pattern established by mobile phone 
companies, which gave away the hardware in order to be able to sell services.  Libraries 
therefore are fast losing the monopoly on access: the majority of our users may soon be 
able to connect to information resources more easily from their living rooms than from a 
terminal in a library. 
 
One can also foresee existing providers of online services offering alternative public 
information services.  The local supermarket might offer community information, adding 
value in order to ensure customers return to the site for their online shopping.  Why 
should our users move from the comfort of their homes to use our connectivity?  Why, 
even, should they connect to, say, a public library website when a commercial website 
they use frequently fulfils their perceived information needs? 
 
One supplier of e-books deals only with end-users, not libraries.  One ‘quotation’ on its 
website from a satisfied customer reads: “I got an A+ using this library. It's so much 
easier than the regular library.” 
 
Libraries’ collective near monopoly on providing and facilitating access to information is 
therefore lost.  However, authority is also diluted.  How far can one trust the information 
offered as an add-on by a commercial service-provider?  For the time being libraries will 
retain the authority conferred by their traditional roles as selectors and organisers of 
information resources. 
 
2.5 Use 
Finally we arrive at the end of the chain and its reason for existence, the user, who, of 
course, particularly in the academic sector may also be the start of the chain. 
 
Hitherto we have stressed that, for traditional printed resources, we have been dealing 
with a physical product.  What we provide to the user is however a service – access to the 
information – not the physical product itself.  Even in the case of photocopies and 
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document delivery, a little thought should demonstrate that this is so: the product is 
returned to the shelf.   
 
Here we also have one of the conundrums of the information chain: how, particularly in 
the traditional print environment, do we measure actual usage of acquired stock?  We as 
librarians routinely collect statistics on loans, footfall etc.  But how well do these 
statistics reflect actual usage?  Of five items borrowed only one may be used or needed; 
the rest may be rejected by the borrower for whatever reason.  Also, how can we 
effectively measure reference usage within the library, and how many libraries regularly 
and accurately do so? 
 
Furthermore, particularly if we only have a very blunt measure of usage, can we equate 
apparent usage with value to the end-user?  If we cannot, how can we justify our 
purchasing decisions? 
 
Holding information electronically offers some help here: it opens the possibility of more 
accurately recording and measuring usage, as expressed in access to and downloads of 
particular texts or services.  It is also possible to envisage systems of payment for such 
usage, either through actual cash transactions or through users having and exchanging a 
number of credits.  Holding information electronically therefore opens the way to more 
accurate measures of both usage by, and value to, the end-user. 
 
3. Money and as indicator of value 
Let us take a little time to chart the flows of money through the value chain, and to reflect 
on where it sticks. 
 
Beginning with the independent creator (i.e. one not employed to write) we note that in 
popular fiction the rewards tend to go to the author.  Stephen King and Tolkien are 
commodities: their creativity is the point of scarcity, and points of scarcity tend to attract 
money. 
 
Scholarly and academic authors, on the other hand, are generally paid nothing, or next-to-
nothing, for their output.  Scholarly journals obviously cannot exist without their output, 
but this dependence is not recognised in economic terms.  It is the publisher, not the 
author, who reaps the direct financial rewards of publication.  This is reflected, for 
instance, in the profits of the big academic publishers.  Thus Houghton notes that "in 
1997 Reed Elsevier enjoyed a higher net profit margin than 473 of the S&P 500 listed 
companies, Wolters Kluwer provided higher return on equity than 482 of the S&P 500, 
and margins generated in the science, technical and medical publishing areas of the 
companies tend to be even higher than aggregate margins".2
 
So what are they rewarded for?  Publishers in effect provide two services: firstly they 
disseminate information; secondly they confer authority by ensuring quality. 
                                                          
2 John Houghton, Economics of scholarly communication: a discussion paper prepared for the Coalition 
for Innovation in Scholarly Communication, Canberra: The Coalition, 2000, p.65; available at: 
http://www.caul.edu.au/cisc/EconomicsScholarlyCommunication.pdf
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Dissemination can be achieved by anyone with a network connection: scholars and 
professionals regularly use e-mail and other similar means of disseminating results.  
Dissemination is not therefore a point of scarcity. This conclusion is supported by an 
examination of the rewards of intermediaries, which shows an interesting difference 
between booksellers and serials agents.  Booksellers are a much more valued part of their 
supply chain.  They can command very high discounts from the publisher, particularly for 
popular fiction, where authority or branding derives from the author.  Thus we see 
discounts of 50% in some supermarkets off the prices of popular books.  Serials agents, 
on the other hand, command very low margins on hard copy – an average of 7% has been 
cited. 
 
It seems therefore that scholarly publishing in academic journals is essentially about 
validation of results through the editorial and peer-review process rather than 
dissemination.  Guédon traces this process of validation, of creating the scholarly record, 
of establishing paternity and property rights, back to the 17th century, where it is already 
evident in the first issues of the Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of 
London.3
 
It must be remembered that scholarly and academic authors do reap indirect rewards from 
publication.  Publication, particularly in prestigious peer-reviewed journals, leads to 
promotion and to research funding.  There is of course institutional, as well as personal, 
interest, in such publication: the funding and prestige of institutions is generated in large 
measure by their scholars.  This institutional interest is particularly evident in the UK, 
where the quinquennial Research Assessment Exercise ranks university departments and 
disburses large sums of money to the best. 
 
There is therefore a large financial interest, on the part of both individual scholars and 
their employing institutions, in continuing to play the game of scholarly publication in 
existing established peer-reviewed journals; this may explain, in part at least, why new 
electronic initiatives outside traditional publishing have not taken off. 
 
Another interesting characteristic of the financial side of scholarly publishing is that the 
user or consumer in general does not pay for the information used.4  Payment is made 
from an institutional budget, generally delegated to the librarian.  The user is therefore 
insulated from considerations of cost and the effects of inflation: unlike most products 
price does not affect demand because the user is not obliged to place a value on the 
product consumed. 
 
                                                          
3 Jean-Claude Guédon, 'In Oldenburg's long shadow: librarians, research scientists, publishers, and the 
control of scientific publishing', ARL proceedings, 138, May 2001, p.3; available at 
http://www.arl.org/arl/proceedings/138/guedon.html. 
4 Fines are levied not for the information delivered but for transgressions against an institutional code.  
Charges for photocopies are for the convenience of the user not for the actual information.  Likewise 
charges for document delivery are generally for the direct costs incurred. 
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We see therefore that academic publishers claim the rewards by virtue of fulfilling a need 
of scholars and institutions for validation.  Their monopoly has allowed them to inflate 
prices, unchecked by a market where the user is insulated from the effects of inflation. 
 
4. The power of consortia? 
Traditionally libraries have bought content from intermediaries: aggregators such as 
booksellers and serials agents.  Over the past ten years in the UK such dealings have been 
carried out increasingly through consortia.  The seven UK regional higher education 
consortia currently have contracts with booksellers and serials agents worth over £70m a 
year. 
 
Such aggregation of purchasing power brings many advantages.  New services such as 
the truly shelf-ready – catalogued, classified and processed – book have been negotiated 
through the strength of consortia.  Quality of service is monitored closely and enhanced 
through continuing management of contracts based on tight specifications of service; 
pooled knowledge of suppliers’ performance against these specifications lends force to 
this process.  There are considerable savings in terms of the time needed by individual 
libraries to manage complex European Commission procurement procedures and the 
resulting contracts.  Quite startling discounts on books have been obtained by UK 
consortia, for both public and academic libraries.  These discounts are given from the 
intermediary’s margin: the difference between the cost of a book to the intermediary and 
the published price.  The intermediaries are in competition for market share, and will 
therefore cut prices and offer services that add value in order to gain such market share. 
 
With e-resources, particularly e-journals, consortia are more likely to negotiate with 
publishers. The economic imperative for publishers is very different from that for 
intermediaries.  Let us take a simple hard-copy example.  If the publisher discounts the 
library price of a well respected journal by 50% its is most unlikely that subscriptions 
will double.  Some libraries will take an additional copy; there will be less cancellations; 
but the number of subscriptions will not rise hugely.  Instead libraries will spend the 
saving on other titles, from other publishers.  By discounting, the publisher has lost 
profitability and decreased market share, hardly good business.  The converse is also true.  
If the library price of the well respected journal is doubled, some subscriptions will be 
lost, but since the title is well respected, by no means 50%: other journals will be 
cancelled instead.  By raising the price the publisher will increase profitability and 
market share.  The disconnection already noted of user, the only true judge of value, from 
price paid has fed the rampant inflation seen in hard-copy journal prices. 
 
The same commercial logic applies in electronic publishing.  It makes no sense for the 
publisher to offer discounts to the individual library, still less to the consortium.  By so 
doing he would simply and immediately decrease both profit and market share.  What 
publishers offer instead of lower prices is additional content.  As we shall see below, this 
bundling puts the publisher in an even stronger position vis-à-vis libraries.5
                                                          
5 For an accessible introduction to the economics see: Richard Poynder, ‘A true market failure: Professor 
Mark McCabe talks about problems in the STM publishing industry’, Information today, 19 (11), 
December 2002, available at: http://www.infotoday.com/it/dec02/poynder.htm.  For a full treatment see 
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5. The product – to – service shift 
We have delineated a new feature of the information value chain that has, I believe, 
weakened our position still further: the shift from buying a product to buying a service. 
 
When we buy a physical product – a book or a journal – our users will have access to it in 
perpetuity.  There are risks – it may be lost or vandalised or read to destruction – but we 
can take steps to minimise these risks.  The point is that we are physical curators and in 
control: the right to the object is inalienable, even if there are restrictions on rights to its 
content.  Our users know that, all things being equal, they may return to our shelves in 
five or ten years' time and retrieve the same item. 
 
However, in the electronic world we do not buy and own a physical product; we buy, 
generally, a time-limited licence that confers certain rights of access to content.  There 
are important differences here. 
 
Firstly, such licences do not necessarily offer archival rights: in such cases our users do 
not have continuing rights of access to material beyond the term of the licence.  Many of 
us involved in consortia take a stand against the loss of archival rights.  BIBSAM in 
Sweden, for instance, has refused recently (March 2003) to continue an agreement with 
AAAS for access to Science Online in part at least because of a refusal to include 
archival rights.  This refusal produced the interesting reaction from Science Online that 
only consortium administrators insist on archival rights; individual libraries do not.  This 
is understandable: libraries, under immediate pressure from their users, are likely to sign 
agreements giving the benefits of electronic access, however imperfect; individual 
libraries are also quite likely to continue to purchase parallel hard copy to guarantee 
continuing archival access. 
 
Secondly, the content to which we buy rights may change.  Titles, imprints and 
companies may be bought, sold, transferred.  There is a well known example in the UK 
of an intermediary selling to public libraries a deal comprising access to national 
newspapers; all was well until the newspapers became concerned at the potential loss of 
revenue from CD-ROM sales and withdrew their titles.  There are also well documented 
examples on the e-mail lists of individual published articles being subsequently 
withdrawn.  In short, there is no guarantee of continuing access to content. 
 
Thirdly, licences may restrict access to content to particular classes of user.  In the UK 
there is an increasing trend, encouraged by the government, to teaching higher education 
courses in colleges of further education.  However licences may restrict usage to a 
particular site or to a particular institution, excluding students and staff elsewhere.  Our 
freedom to determine who may have access to our resources has been forfeited. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Mark J. McCabe, Academic journal pricing and market power: a portfolio approach, 2000, available at: 
http://www.prism.gatech.edu/%7Emm284/JournPub.PDF. 
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5. Business models 
The most remarkable business model to have emerged in electronic publishing is the so-
called big, or all-you-can-eat, deal.  This is particularly prevalent in the field of e-
journals, but may also be seen in the field of e-books. 
 
Under the big deal, a journal publisher will grant access to all their titles for three or five 
years.  There is an annual subscription, often based on the cost of the subscriber’s 
previous print subscriptions, with some built-in increase for inflation and generally a no-
cancellation clause.  Libraries and their users will therefore have access to all of the 
publisher’s content spanning however many years are available in the electronic archive. 
 
There are potential benefits for both sides.  Users have immediate access to material 
previously not subscribed to at no incremental cost.  Libraries can predict inflation over 
the term of the agreement, and save money from the document supply budget.  Publishers 
have a stable revenue stream for a number of years, with no cancellations. 
 
However, things are seldom as straightforward as they seem. 
 
There is some statistical evidence to show that users are downloading or hitting articles 
well outside the range of the previously subscribed core of hard-copy titles.  
Understandably this has caused librarians a fair amount of anguish, since it implies that 
our past collecting policy has been ill advised. 
 
However, we have to treat this evidence with some caution. It has not been collected for 
very long: it offers a short time series at the start of a new service.  There is no real 
comparison with previous data: librarians have generally not collected usage data for 
their journals, partly because much consultation of them has been within the library.  
There is also the sweet-shop syndrome: children suddenly given the freedom of a sweet 
shop will gorge initially far beyond the value of their pocket money before their appetites 
stabilise.  The take-up of articles by academics may decline too over time as the novelty 
disappears.  Also, we may be observing the substitution of full article hits or downloads 
for previous use of abstracting services: because the download or consultation is free, 
academics may use that mechanism where they would previously have been satisfied 
with an abstract.  In other words the distortion that we noted above, arising from the 
divorce of the user from the cost of the information, is magnified.  We are perhaps even 
further away from measuring value to the consumer, rather than usage. 
 
In my opinion therefore the prima facie case that the big deal offers major benefits in 
terms of access to information is not necessarily proved.  Indeed there is some 
countervailing statistical evidence.  Hamaker for instance notes that 28% of Science 
Direct titles accounted for 75% of downloads at the University of North Carolina.  34% 
of titles had five downloads or less.  40% of usage occurred in a single month for 57% of 
titles.6  Nicholas’s initial study of the Emerald big deal shows that  43% of subscribers 
                                                          
6 Chuck Hamaker, 'Quantity, quality and the role of consortia', What's the Big Deal? Journal Purchasing – 
Bulk Buying or Cherry Picking?  Strategic issues for librarians, publishers, agents and intermediaries, 
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viewed only one journal out of 118; another 40% viewed 2-5 journals.  So 83% of 
subscribers viewed less than 5% of the available titles.  44% of subscribers viewed only 
one subject area out of about 10; a further 19% viewed only 2 subject areas.7
The core collection, it seems, is still alive and well. 
 
There is also a hidden danger in the availability of the full output of some of the bigger 
publishers.  Guédon traces the influence of the citation indexes’ documentation of impact 
factors for journals in creating a core collection of must-have journals for particular 
disciplines.  He also posits an increase in citations of the journals of big deal publishers 
(understandable given their availability) in the research output of subscribing 
universities.8  We have therefore potentially a vicious circle where the journals in big 
deals have higher and higher impact factors, to the detriment of journals outside the big 
deals.  The effect on the market-place will be to undermine the financial viability of such 
journals and their (generally smaller) publishers. 
 
The big deal is also challenging for librarians.  Under it we no longer take the decisions 
on developing our collections that we have been used to (not necessarily a bad thing, 
some would say, on the basis of some of the statistics mentioned above).  We shall 
increasingly decide on content not at the journal level but at the publisher level.  This is a 
qualitative change and one that does not necessarily work in our or our users’ favour.  
The user is focused on the article, to a lesser extent on the journal title, and most certainly 
not on the publisher.  In the electronic environment, where the physical package – the 
title – is no longer necessary for purchase, our aim surely should be to increase the 
granularity of decision making, not decrease it. 
 
I believe that the big deal may also presage a further unwelcome effect on the market 
place.  We recall that publishers are monopolists: only they own the rights to their 
content and determine the terms.  In the environment of consumer publications there is 
some substitutability: instead of buying The Times one can buy The Independent; they are 
different brands but with very similar news content.  However, in the academic world 
there is virtually no substitutability of primary content: if Researcher A needs the 
published results of Researcher B, the results of Researcher C will not do; if results in 
Researcher A's field are published in Journal Y, Journal Z will not do.  The big deal 
commits a library to either buy or cancel the entire content of a monopolist: the 
monopoly is thereby intensified.  The monopoly is intensified even further in the case of 
national deals covering an entire library sector.  Such intensification cannot be in the 
interests of the purchaser. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ASA 2003 conference; available at http://www.subscription-
agents.org/conference/200302/chuck.hamaker.pps. 
7 David Nicholas and Paul Huntington, ‘Big deals: results and analysis from a pilot analysis of web log 
data: report for the Ingenta Institute’, in  The consortium site licence: is it a sustainable model? Edited 
proceedings of a meeting held on 24th September 2002 at the Royal Society, London, Oxford: Ingenta, 2002 
(Ingenta Institute, 2002), pp121-159, pp149, 151. 
8 Guédon, p.24 
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There is also a danger that, at renewal time, publishers can offer libraries a stark choice: 
pay an additional 50% (or more) for the big deal or cancel.  Few academic libraries will 
be able to refuse the big deals, because they contain so many must-have titles.  The 
inflation we have seen for hard-copy titles, enabled by the disconnection of user from 
price paid, will now be further fuelled by bundling into the big deal.  The consequence 
will therefore be that journals outside the big deals will be cancelled.  Publishers, 
particularly the smaller ones will cease trading, and there will be further consolidation in 
the marketplace. 
 
I have dwelt here on e-journals, as the more mature electronic market.  A similar 
characteristic is also evident in the e-books market, where some aggregators offer the 
equivalent of the big deal: one subscribes to all or nothing, or to business or IT libraries 
of several hundred titles.  Again there is no selection at the individual title level, only at 
the library or publisher level. 
 
It must however be said that there is also a countervailing trend in the e-book market, 
where at least one intermediary enables libraries to subscribe title by title and to change 
these titles every month. 
 
It must be in our interests as librarians and purchasers to encourage those trends and the 
suppliers that offer us the flexibility and granularity that we and our users require. 
 
6. What can libraries do? 
We have seen that the marketplace is changing, that the big publishers are introducing 
business models that seem to benefit the user but that are potentially dangerous in their 
effects, threatening the viability of the smaller publishers and exacerbating the tendency 
to consolidation. 
 
There are a number of measures we can take to strengthen both the position of libraries  
and to change the publishing environment. 
 
Firstly, in spite of what I have said above, we can form and support library consortia.  
These can be powerful entities, particularly when they take a holistic view uniting 
procurement of both print and electronic resources: publishers produce and deal in both 
media; we integrate print and electronic forms in our hybrid libraries; we should integrate 
their procurement too.  They are the only library organisations that have a chance of 
affecting the marketplace; individual libraries certainly do not, given the conditions 
outlined above. 
 
Secondly we can follow the normal procurement process.  Currently we have let 
suppliers, the publishers, take control.  We can regain it by observing the standard 
procurement cycle: 
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i. Identify the need  
ii. Prepare the specification 
iii. Find the supplier  
iv. Award the contract  
v. Measure and monitor suppliers’ performance  
 
This cycle, particularly through the specification and by monitoring performance against 
that specification, puts the purchaser firmly in control.  Admittedly such control is easier 
to achieve where there is competition between suppliers (e.g. booksellers or serials 
agents) and not a monopoly as with publishers.  However by allowing the publishers to 
dictate the terms of engagement we are ceding too much. 
 
Thirdly we can support alternative publishing initiatives such as SPARC.  As we have 
discussed above, traditional hard-copy publishing in peer-reviewed journals is deeply 
entrenched because of institutional and personal interests in the scholarly community.  
These initiatives can however be held up as alternatives, even if there is little chance that 
in themselves they will become rivals to traditional publishing.  As Guédon remarks,9 
pitting SPARC against the big publishers is like pitting David against Goliath; in my 
view there is the added disadvantage that Goliath has chosen a stone-free field of battle. 
 
Finally, we can involve our users more.  Many of the current and historical problems are 
exacerbated by divorcing the user from payment for information.  I do not suggest that 
the user should be made to pay, rather that the economic consequences of their demands 
should be made clear to them.  We can involve them more in the procurement cycle 
outlined above: how many consortia or individual libraries consult the end-user about the 
specification or include them in contract management? 
 
Furthermore, electronic publishing allows procurement decisions at a greater level of 
granularity – the individual article or chapter.  One demonstration of this was the Pricing 
Electronic Access to Knowledge (PEAK) trial in electronic access, pricing and bundling 
by the University of Michigan and Elsevier Science.10  It provided access to 
approximately 1200 Elsevier Science journals for a period of 18 months.  Institutions first 
had to buy a participation licence, which allows searching of the database of articles.  
PEAK then offered three access models: 
 
♦ Traditional subscription – Institutions and individual users can buy unlimited 
access to a set of articles that correspond to a print journal title. 
♦ Generalised subscription – Institutional users can buy unlimited access to bundles 
comprising any 120 articles from the entire database of priced content.  Articles are 
                                                          
9 Guédon, p.16. 
10For a more detailed analysis of the PEAK experiment see the author’s 'The information value chain: 
emerging models for procuring electronic publications', Online information 2000: 24th International Online 
Information Meeting: proceedings, conference editor Catherine Graham (Oxford: Learned Information 
Europe, 2000), pp.213-223.  Detailed original reports may be found on: 
http://www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/peak/
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selected after the fact of subscription and may be accessed by all authorised users at 
the institution. 
♦ Per Article – Individual users can buy limited access to a specific article for a fixed 
price. 
 
PEAK is a most interesting model for almost the whole of the information chain: to the 
publisher it offers some degree of stability of income and the possibility of tapping 
budgets presently devoted to document delivery; to the library and its patrons it offers 
flexibility of collection and selection combined with budgetary control; it also offers the 
possibility of devolving purchasing decisions to the end-user. 
 
The traditional subscription model is similar to hard-copy subscription, facilitating the 
purchase of core ‘cover-to-cover’ titles.  The generalised subscription model breaks the 
tyranny of the title, allowing libraries to build the eclectic collections their users require.  
Publishers would retain their position of authority, through the editorial process, but the 
importance of branding inherent in the serial title would diminish. 
 
The purchasing decisions in the generalised subscription (and per article) models can be 
devolved as the institution wishes: to the subject librarian, to faculty representatives, to 
individual members of academic staff or even the student body.  This devolution helps to 
overcome the chief disconnection of user from price noted above: individual users are 
much closer to controlling the spending of budgets in accord with their needs.This should 
result in better value for money from library spending. 
 
A generally applied PEAK model, with the major publishers participating, might also 
have interesting implications for the position of publishers as monopolists. With 
purchasing decisions made at the level of the individual article, there may be more 
intense competition between publishers on content, price and terms of use. 
 
My feeling is that few publishers will be brave enough to open themselves to this type of 
competition.  But new business models, such as PEAK, seem to me to be the only bright 
prospect on a darkening horizon. 
 
7. Vale 
Returning to our opening folk-tale, the little porridge pot on everyone's desk is a major 
benefit in satisfying information hunger.  However it is vital that we, the purchasers, 
retain control of it by not forgetting the magic words of command, or relinquishing them 
to others. 
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